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To what extent do financing frictions constrain investments that firms would otherwise
make? This question is arguably one of the most important in corporate finance, and one about
which there continues to be significant debate. Since Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson (1988) first
estimated the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flow generation, the literature has argued
about whether their finding that greater internal capital corresponds to greater investment was driven
by the relaxing of financing constraints enabling investment that would otherwise have been forgone
or whether the higher internal cash flow merely proxied for improvements in investment
opportunities beyond the controls in their specification (Kaplan and Zingales, 2000, and Erickson
and Whited, 2000). This literature has primarily focused on the cost of external financing, and thus
assumed that all internal capital is fungible and equally cheap. Although this is a reasonable
assumption for many firms, it can be flawed when firms have cash in foreign subsidiaries (Foley et
al, 2007). In these cases, there can be a significant tax cost to bringing the cash home to fund
domestic investment. 
The American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) was passed in 2004 with the explicit purpose of
promoting domestic investment and employment. The act significantly and temporarily lowered the
cost of repatriating foreign capital and thus the cost of funding domestic investments with internal
foreign cash. American multinational firms had large stockpiles of unrepatriated foreign earnings.
Since firms owe US tax on their foreign earnings only when they repatriate the income, this raises
the cost of funding domestic investment with the foreign cash. Congress believed that the US tax
code was distorting the domestic investment decisions of US firms by discouraging them from
repatriating foreign earnings and investing this capital in the US. By temporarily reducing the tax
cost of repatriating foreign earnings, Congress hoped to increase domestic investment. The capital
was already inside the firm. The law only temporarily lowered the cost of using this internal capital
to fund domestic investment. This paper examines whether the tax holiday in the AJCA worked: did
firms that repatriated under the act significantly increase their domestic investment?2
To analyze the effects of the American Jobs Creation Act, we examined firms' 10-K filings
and collected: the amount of unrepatriated foreign earnings reported by each firm, whether the firm
repatriated funds under the Act, and if so, how much they repatriated. To estimate the extent to
which firms who repatriated foreign earnings under the AJCA responded to the incentives, we
supplemented this data with changes in the firms' investment, financing, and equity payout decisions
in the years prior to and following the repatriation. If the legislative intent of the Act was achieved,
we would expect to see that investment increased for those firms that repatriated income relative to
those firms that did not repatriate but which had foreign earnings that could have been repatriated.
Finance theory predicts, however, that firms with unfettered access to the capital markets
would already be optimizing their investment. In other words, a crucial and unstated assumption
underlying the Act is that firms were unable to raise sufficient funds from external markets at
reasonable prices and were not generating sufficient internal domestic funds to finance all available
domestic investment opportunities. If a firm can access external capital or generate sufficient
internal domestic capital to fully fund their domestic investments, we would not expect the Act to
have any effect on the firm's investment. We can test this hypothesis by examining whether firms
that were least able to generate internal funds prior to the law change, or inexpensively access
external capital markets, saw significantly higher increases in investment relative to the financially
unconstrained firms that also repatriated foreign earnings under the Act.
We are not the first to empirically examine the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA).
Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes (2011) and Blouin and Krull (2009), among others, examine the use
of funds repatriated under the AJCA. Both papers conclude that the majority of repatriated funds
were used to increase payments to shareholders (their estimates range from 50 to 90%). Dharmapala,
Foley, and Forbes find no increase in investment due to repatriation. We find the opposite. We find
the AJCA led to large increases in investment, but only among the subset of firm which are capital
constrained. These firms increased their investment by 11 percent, investing 78 percent of the capital
they repatriated. While these firms represent 44 percent of repatriating firms, they account for only3
27 percent of the repatriated funds. We find minimal increases in payments to shareholders of
unconstrained firms. At most 25 percent of their repatriated cash is goes to higher equity payouts
in the years following repatriation. The difference in results is attributable to differences in the
empirical methods. Each of the papers uses a difference in difference regression method (DID), but
the papers differ in how the firms in the sample are classified into the treated and untreated groups
in the DID regression. As we will show in the empirical section, if this classification is done
incorrectly, one cannot isolate the effect of repatriation from differences between firms which have
unrepatriated foreign earnings and those that do not. Given the first-order nature of the investment
/ cash flow sensitivity question as well as the fact that Congress is considering another repatriation
tax holiday, it is important that we ascertain an accurate understanding of the impact of this
temporary change in tax policy.
This paper has several objectives. First, we measure how changes in the cost of internal
finance affect firm's investment and financial decisions, using the repatriation provision of the AJCA
as a natural experiment. The tax law change unexpectedly lowered the cost of internal financing to
a subset of firms – those with a stockpile of foreign earnings - without altering forward-looking
domestic investment opportunities. We can therefore examine how this reduction in the cost of
internal capital changed the firm's domestic investment and their reliance on external financing.
Second, the results of the paper help us assess the effect of tax law changes as an instrument for
altering corporate investment. Changes in tax rates can change the cost of different financing
methods, as well as the returns on investment. However, knowing how these changes affect firms'
incremental investment decisions requires us to understand the fundamental financial assumptions
that the tax laws implicitly make but rarely state. In this instance, we can document the incentives
provided under the Act and measure how investment responded to the tax incentives. Third, to the
extent that we can document that the change in the tax incentives only benefitted capital constrained
firms, we may be able to provide guidance on how future tax incentives should be targeted. Finally,
we make a methodological contribution by demonstrating the importance of correctly defining the4
groups in a DID regression to isolate the effect that one wants to examine and thus produce unbiased
estimates. 
The paper is organized as follows. We first describe the American Jobs Creation Act, how
it temporarily changed the incentives to defer repatriation, and the implicit financial assumption that
lies behind the law. In Section III, we explain our empirical strategy, compare our approach to the
alternative applications of DID regressions used in prior papers, and explain why this leads to
different empirical findings. We describe the data we collected in Section IV and the characteristics
of firms which repatriated income under the AJCA in Section V. We find that the average firm that
repatriated under the Act was a large, profitable firm with relatively fewer investment opportunities
compared to those that did not repatriate. These are not the stereotypical capital constrained firms
that would be foregoing valuable investment opportunities. In Section VI, we examine the effect of
the law on the real and financial decisions of the firm. We find that the average firm that repatriated
funds under the AJCA did not significantly increase their investment. However, when we focus on
the subset of repatriating firms that were most likely to have underfunded investment prior to the
Act, we do find a significant increase in investment, after controlling for firm characteristics
including the likelihood of repatriating. These constrained firms repatriated a quarter of the total
amount repatriated under the Act but spent a majority of their repatriated funds on domestic
investment. Once the DID regression is correctly specified, we find minimal increases in payouts
to shareholders. Section VII contains a brief summary and the implications of our findings.
II)  Description of Foreign Taxation and the American Jobs Creation Act 
A) Foreign Taxation - A Simple Example
The intent of the American Jobs Creation Act was to encourage domestic investment by
lowering the tax cost of repatriating income that US firms had earned abroad. To understand the
incentives a firm has for repatriating foreign income and how the AJCA changes these incentives,
it is useful to start with a simple example of how foreign earnings of US corporations are taxed. This
will also make the underlying financial assumptions of the law clear.5
We start with a US firm that faces a marginal tax rate on domestic income of 35%. The firm
has a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary in a country where the marginal corporate tax rate is 5%. If
the firm earns $100 in the foreign subsidiary, it pays $5 to the foreign government. If it then
repatriates the remaining $95 to the US, it owes US taxes on the foreign income. To calculate the
US tax, the firm grosses its repatriated dividend up by one minus the foreign tax rate. Thus, the
entire $100, the pre-foreign tax income, is taxable in the US at the marginal rate of 35%. The US
tax liability is $35. To avoid double taxation of the foreign income at the corporate level, the US
allows the firm to take a credit for the taxes paid to the foreign government. The credit cannot reduce
the US tax liability on the foreign income below zero (i.e. when τF > τD). In our example, the net US
tax liability on the foreign income is $30 if the firm repatriates the income today.
If the firm repatriates the income in the same year it is earned, the tax rate is the same
whether the income is earned domestically or abroad. If instead the firm chooses to defer repatriation
and reinvests the income abroad, the present value of the taxes falls and the effective marginal tax
rate falls below 35%. In this case, the tax is $5 now plus the present value of the future tax
payments. The longer the deferral, the lower the present value of the tax on foreign income. This
creates both an incentive for deferring repatriation of foreign income, as well as an incentive to earn
the income in foreign, low-tax, jurisdictions. This is the logic behind Foley et al’s (2007) finding
that US firms hold significant cash in their foreign subsidiaries. In a world where investment
opportunities are the same in both the foreign and domestic country and there are no capital market
imperfections, deferral is a dominant strategy, as it lowers the present value of tax payments and
raises the after-corporate tax rate of returns. The AJCA was designed to change this by lowering the
marginal corporate tax ($30 in our example) that was due upon repatriation.


















(1)1 For our illustration, we have assumed the alternative domestic investment earns 10% pre-corporate tax and
6.5% post-domestic corporate tax. We will thus discount the after-corporate tax cash flows from delayed repatriation
at 6.5% [=10%* (1-0.35)]. If the domestic investment earns 10% pre-corporate tax and is taxed at 35% each year, then
it is a zero NPV investment by construction. Thus the value of the investment is its year zero value of $65. 
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pre-corporate tax return on both foreign and domestic investment is ten percent. To calculate the
value of the deferral, compare the present value of the foreign investment, assuming the income is
repatriated in year ten, to the value of repatriating the foreign income today. The value of
repatriating the income today is $65 [$100 pre-tax income minus $35 in foreign and domestic
taxes].
1 To calculate the value of deferred repatriation, we first calculate the future after-domestic
and foreign tax cash flow, then discount it back at the firm’s after-corporate tax discount rate. 
The first term in the numerator is the after-foreign tax cash flow at the end of ten years when the
firm starts with $100 of pre-foreign tax income. The second term is the incremental US tax that will
be due on the foreign income when it is repatriated in year ten. This calculation shows that by
deferring the repatriation for ten years, the firm raises the present value of its after-tax cash flow
from $65 (repatriate today) to $85.8 (delay repatriation). Instead of paying $35 in corporate taxes
today, the firm pays current and future taxes that have a present value of only $14.2 [$100 pre-
corporate tax income minus $85.8 present value of after-corporate tax income].
B) Description of the American Jobs Creation Act
To encourage the repatriation of foreign income and investment in the United States, the
American Jobs Creation Act allowed US firms to exclude eighty-five percent of their repatriated
foreign income if they elected to repatriate the income under the AJCA and abided by the law’s
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(2)2 In discussions of the AJCA in the financial press, the incremental tax on repatriation was usually stated as
5.25% [ (0-0.85)0.35]. In our sample, 69 percent of the repatriating firms reported both the amount of foreign income
they were repatriating and a positive tax due on the repatriation. For these firms, the mean tax rate is 5.5 percent (median
5.2 percent). This number should be higher than 5.25% due to state taxes and lower due to the partial use of the foreign
tax credits. Some of the firms reported negative net tax payments due upon repatriation, and are excluded from this
calculation.
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restrictions. This temporarily reduced the tax cost of repatriation. To demonstrate how the tax
savings work and illustrate their potential magnitude, we use the numerical example from above.
When repatriating foreign income without the benefit of the AJCA, the firm could bring home $95
in cash dividends from its foreign subsidiary and would owe an additional $30 in US corporate taxes
today (see equation 1). If the same $95 in cash was repatriated under the AJCA, the firm would
include only fifteen percent of the cash dividend in taxable income. The firm is allowed to offset part
of its incremental tax with its foreign tax credits, but it may only claim 15% of the foreign tax
credits. Just as 85% of the cash dividend is excluded from income, 85% of the foreign tax credits
are lost. Thus, repatriating the income under the AJCA leads to a total tax liability of 9.2.
2
This compares to a tax of 35 if the firm repatriated immediately under the prior law and a present
value of taxes of 14.2 if the firm deferred repatriation (and thus would be taxed under the prior law
in the future). The firms for which the incentive to defer repatriation is the greatest (τD - τF is the
largest) also gain the most from repatriating under the AJCA.
To receive the tax subsidy on repatriated income, firms had to abide by a number of
restrictions in the law. Our description here is brief. A more complete description is available in
Blouin and Krull (2009), Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin (2010), and the online appendix. First, the
repatriation had to be in cash. This could create a problem for firms whose foreign earnings were
invested in real assets and were thus cash poor. Among the repatriators in our sample, twenty-six
percent repatriated more cash than their total firm-wide cash holdings as of the end of the fiscal year
prior to or following their repatriation (Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin’s (2010) survey results report
similar magnitudes). Such cash poor subsidiaries could borrow to fund their repatriation. However,
        
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     
(3)3 The permanently reinvested foreign earnings (PRE) number was taken from the firm’s most recent financial
statement filed with the SEC on or before June 30, 2003. The original effective date of the law was June 30, 2003. Due
to delays in drafting, this was pushed back to June 30, 2004. However, the date for the financial statements was not
changed from June 30, 2003 because the tax committee did not want to give firms the opportunity to increase the amount
of income which they report as indefinitely invested abroad and thus increase the amount of qualified dividends which
they could claim. If the firm did not report PRE in their financial statements but did report the incremental tax, the
maximum allowed repatriation was the incremental tax divided by 35% (e.g. 85.7 = 30/0.35 in our numerical example).
If neither numbers were reported, then the maximum repatriation was $500M. This last number was used for public firms
that do not report PRE as well as private firms that do not disclose their financial statements.
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loans from the parent limited the amount the firm could repatriate, so it is more likely that the
subsidiaries borrowed from outside markets. We found a number of cases where firms described the
loans which funded the repatriation, but such disclosures were not the norm.
The amount of the repatriation was also limited by the amount of foreign earnings the firm
reported it had abroad. Firms with unrepatriated foreign income may be required to report a deferred
tax liability on their balance sheet. This is the marginal tax which will be due upon repatriation ($30
in our numerical example above). Firms are not required to report a deferred tax liability if they
deem the income as “indefinitely” or “permanently” invested outside the US (APB 23 - Accounting
for Income Taxes - Special Areas, see Albring, Dzuranin, and Mills, 2005). In this case, the firm
reports the amount of permanently reinvested foreign earnings ($95 in our numerical example)
and/or the incremental tax that would be due upon repatriation ($30 in our numerical example) in
the income tax notes of their 10-K. The AJCA used the amount of foreign earnings that are
“permanently reinvested outside the United States” as reported on the firm’s financial statements
as a limit on the maximum allowed repatriation (e.g. the firm’s 10-K).
3 In addition, only incremental
repatriations were eligible for the preferred tax treatment. Firms calculated a base level of
repatriations based on the five tax years prior to June 30, 2003. Only repatriated amounts above this
base level were eligible for the tax subsidy. Thus in our numerical example, if the firm had
repatriated 20 each of the prior five years, only 75 (95-20) would be eligible for lower tax rate under
the AJCA.
The final restrictions are the focus of our paper. The legislative intent of the law was to
encourage domestic investment and employment. Thus, to qualify for the lower tax rate on9
repatriated foreign income, the law required firms to adopt a domestic reinvestment plan that
described the planned investment in the US (IRS Notice 2005-10). The list of permissible
investments include expenditures on “worker hiring and training, infrastructure, research and
development, capital investments or the financial stabilization of the corporation for the purposes
of job retention or creation.” (American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Section 422: Incentives to
reinvest foreign earnings in United States). The last phrase was interpreted to mean that paying
down debt would be an acceptable use of the repatriated funds. Later regulations explicitly included
expenditures on advertising or marketing and investment in brand names, trademarks, and other
intangibles assets as permissible investments (IRS Notice 2005-10, February, 2005). The list was
not meant to be exhaustive, but certain uses of the funds (e.g. distributions to the firm’s shareholders
such as dividends) were explicitly prohibited.
C) AJCA’s Implicit Financial Assumption
The purpose of the AJCA’s temporary tax reduction on repatriated foreign income was to
encourage US firms to increase domestic investment and employment. To understand when this
incentive will have real effects on investment and when it will not, we need to examine the implicit
financial assumption that underlies the AJCA’s temporary tax reduction. In a world without financial
frictions, firms will invest in all positive NPV projects, independent of where the firm’s projects or
capital are located. If a US firm has domestic positive NPV projects, it will finance them by
repatriating the foreign income, by using internal domestic cash flow, or by accessing the capital
markets. In the presence of financial frictions, the choice of financing will depend upon which
method is cheaper (assuming all options are available), and thus will be influenced by the tax code.
Before and after the window created by the AJCA, bringing home foreign earnings from a low-tax
subsidiary had a large tax cost. Under the AJCA, this tax cost was reduced dramatically. However,
if the firm can fund the project with domestic cash flow or access the capital markets by selling
securities at the correct price, the AJCA will change only how investments are financed. It will not
generate any incremental investment.10
Thus the unstated financial assumption behind the AJCA is that firms’ domestic operations
are capital constrained. The logic of the law assumes that US multinationals have capital that is
“trapped” in their foreign subsidiaries and positive NPV investment projects in the US, but firms
have insufficient internal capital in the US and are unable to inexpensively raise the capital to invest
in these projects. They could repatriate their foreign income, but the tax cost of this was assumed
to be sufficiently high (larger than the NPV of the foregone investments) that the firms would
choose not to invest domestically rather than repatriate the foreign income under the current law.
This means that there are two types of firms that will repatriate foreign income under the AJCA. The
first type are firms which are not capital constrained but who find that repatriating income under the
AJCA lowers the present value of their corporate taxes, although it will raise the current year’s cash
taxes. The second type are firms which are capital constrained and repatriating the foreign earnings
will allow them to fund investments that they would otherwise be unable to fund. If there are a
significant number of firms with valuable domestic investment opportunities that have insufficient
domestic internal resources and for which accessing outside capital is too costly, then the AJCA
could generate the intended increase in investment, provided that these are also the types of firms
that have significant earnings in their overseas subsidiaries without commensurate foreign
investment opportunities. The unstated financial assumption behind the AJCA is that a significant
portion of firms with profitable overseas subsidiaries are capital constrained in their domestic
operations. Thus, in our empirical work, we will focus on how repatriating income under the AJCA
changed the investment and financial decisions of both capital constrained and capital unconstrained
firms. Theory suggests that the increase in investment will arise only in the former set of firms.
III) Empirical Strategy and the Prior Literature
A) Empirical Design: Difference in Difference Regressions (DID)
To analyze the effects of the American Jobs Creation Act on investment and financial policy,
we will use a difference-in-difference (DID) regression approach. The prior literature has used the
same basic method. In a DID approach, the sample is divided into a treated and an untreated group.4 When explaining the empirical approach, we describe having foreign earnings in a low tax jurisdiction (and
thus repatriating under the AJCA is valuable to the firm) or not as a binary classification. This is not correct. As we will
show in Section V, both the existence and the magnitude of foreign earnings predicts the probability a firm repatriates
foreign income under the AJCA. Thus in the empirical work, we will use a probabilistic classification of the likelihood
a firm repatriates income under the AJCA. The binary classification is used here to make the intuition clear. 
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Then the change in the response variable (e.g. investment) of the treated group is compared to the
change in the response variable of the untreated group, controlling for firm characteristics including
firm dummies. This method is complicated in our context because there are three groups, not the
traditional two (treated and untreated). The difference between our findings and the results of prior
work can be best explained by how the prior papers have combined the three groups into two,
compared to our paper where they are left as three groups.
Conceptually, the sample of firms can be divided into three groups (see Table I). First, is the
group of firms which have little or no foreign earnings in low tax jurisdictions. They may have no
foreign operations or foreign operations which are not yet profitable. Alternatively, they may have
foreign earnings but in countries where the tax rate is higher than in the US and so there would be
no value of repatriating under the AJCA (see discussion in Section II-B). These firms have a low
probability of repatriating under the AJCA.
4 The second group contains firms which could repatriate
foreign income under the AJCA, as they have foreign income in low-tax jurisdictions, but chose not
to repatriate this income. The third group also has unrepatriated income in low tax foreign
jurisdictions, and chose to repatriate income under the AJCA.
B) Findings of Prior Literature
We are not the first to analyze the effect of the AJCA (see Clemons and Kinney (2007),
Brennan (2008), Brennan (2010), Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin (2010), Blouin and Krull (2009),
Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes (2011)). The two papers which are closest to our work are Blouin
and Krull (2009 – henceforth BK) and Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes (2011 – henceforth DFF).
Like our work, both papers examine the use of repatriated funds. Our findings, however, are exactly
opposite of the prior papers’ results. BK do not examine firms’ investment behavior as they assume5 Based on the mean value of firm characteristics in their sample, BK conclude the repatriating firms are not
capital constrained and thus they did not expect to find any investment effect. We also find that the average repatriating
firm is not capital constrained, but a subset of firms are. We return to this issue in Section IV-C.
6 Our data set contains 442 firms which repatriated foreign income under the AJCA. DFF’s sample contains
261 repatriating firms and BK’s sample contains 357 repatriating firms.
12
firms are financially unconstrained.
5 DFF finds no increase in investment, even when they examine
a subset of firms which are capital constrained, whereas we find large increases in investment among
the subset of capital constrained firms. Both BK and DFF conclude that a majority of the repatriated
funds were paid out to shareholders. BK find that 50% of the repatriated income went to increases
in payments to shareholders (Blouin and Krull 2009, page 1056), whereas DFF finds that over 90%
of the repatriated income goes to increases in payments to shareholders (Dharmapala, Foley, and
Forbes, 2011, page 770). We find a small portion of the repatriated income is paid out to
shareholders, and only among financially unconstrained firms. The increase in shareholder payments
is not a robust finding and often is statistically insignificant.
The difference cannot be explained by differences in the sample; we are able to replicate the
prior results with our data set.
6 The different results arise from the use of different empirical
methods. Each of the three papers (BK, DFF and ours), use a difference in difference (DID)
regression approach, but the papers differ in how the three groups discussed above are collapsed into
a treated and untreated group. We will briefly explain the different approaches used in each paper,
and leave a comparison of the actual findings to the empirical section.
To help understand why the results may differ across the three methods, we have constructed
a hypothetical data structure to use as an illustration. In the hypothetical data structure, we assume
that firms which do not have tax advantaged foreign earnings (Group 1) do not increase the response
variable (Y, e.g. investment or equity payouts) on average in the second half of the sample versus
the first half of the sample (see Table I). We assume that firms with tax advantaged foreign earnings
increase the response variable in the second half of the sample by 2% whether they repatriate (Group
3) or not (Group 2). Thus for this illustration, we have assumed that repatriation has no effect.7 In their initial results, BK use only the year of repatriation. In additional results, they extend the after
repatriation sample to multiple years. They also do not include firms that repatriated in 2006, which is why their sample
of repatriating firms is smaller than ours. 
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BK run a standard DID regression by including a dummy variable which is equal to one in
the year a firm repatriates and all years afterward, and zero otherwise.
7 Thus their coefficient
measures the increase in the response variable for the firms that repatriate (Group 3) versus the
increase in the response variable for firms that do not repatriate (Groups 1 & 2 – see Table I). From
this approach it is not possible to know if their measured effect is due to repatriation (a comparison
of Group 3 to Group 2) or due to differences between firms with and without foreign earnings in low
tax jurisdictions (e.g. differences between Group 1 and Groups 2 & 3). Returning to the example in
Table I, their specification compares the 2% increase in Y of firms that repatriate (Group 3) to the
average increase of all the non-repatriating firms. Some of these have foreign earnings and increased
Y by 2% (Group 2), even though they do not repatriate their foreign earnings. Some of the non-
repatriating firms have no foreign earnings and do not increase Y (Group 1). Since the first group
has a higher increase in investment than the second group, the coefficient on the AJCA dummy is
positive even when there is no effect. If αi is the fraction of the sample in group i, the estimated
coefficient would be:
When estimated this way, the coefficient can be too high, as in this example, or too low (see online
appendix for a more general data structure).
DFF take a different approach to collapsing the data into a treated and untreated group. They
correctly note that the decision to repatriate is a decision of the firm and thus may introduce an
endogeneity bias into the estimation (we discuss this in Sections III-C and VI-A-2). They use an
instrumental variable approach, and use whether the firm’s foreign tax rate is lower than the US and
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whether the firm’s foreign subsidiaries are in tax havens as instruments. This effectively replaces
the AJCA dummy variable used in BK with the probability that the firm repatriates. Firms which
have unrepatriated income in low tax foreign jurisdictions will have a high probability of
repatriation. When estimated this way, the coefficient measures the increase in the response variable
for firms with a high probability of repatriation (Group 2 and Group 3) independent of whether they
actually repatriate income versus the increase in the response variable for firms with a low
probability of repatriation (Group 1). Based on the hypothetical data structure in Table I, the DFF
specification would compare the 2% increase in Y of firms that have a high probability of
repatriating (Groups 2 & 3) to the zero change in Y for the firms with a low probability of
repatriating (Group 2). The estimated coefficient would be:
When estimated this way, the coefficient is both positive and larger than the BK finding even though
the true effect is zero in our illustration.
An analogy may help. Take the case where we have a group of people who are healthy
(Group 1) or sick (Groups 2 & 3). A subset of the sick people are given a treatment (Group 3). If we
want to evaluate the performance of the treatment, we would not compare the change in health of
those who received the treatment (Group 3) to those who did not (Groups 1 & 2), as this would
confound the effect of the treatment with the health of the population. This is the approach used in
BK. Neither would we compare the change in the health of those that were predicted to receive the
treatment (the sick – Groups 2 & 3) to those who are unlikely to receive the treatment (the healthy
– Group 1). This is the approach used in DFF.
Neither of the approaches used so far can answer the question we are asking. We want to
know if conditional on being able to take advantage of the tax subsidy on repatriation in the AJCA,
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(5)8 Once the intuition of the approach is clear, the questions arises why we don’t drop Group 1 completely, and
compare the response of Group 2 and Group 3. We will return to this issue in Section VI-A-3 & VI-D.
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do firms invest more or increase equity payouts if they repatriated income under the AJCA? Since
there are three groups among which we need to distinguish in the DID, as opposed to the typical
two, we need two coefficients.
8 One coefficient to distinguish Group 1 from Groups 2 & 3 and one
to distinguish Group 2 from Group 3. We discuss the construction of the predicted probability of
repatriation in Section V, and then we estimate the effect of the AJCA using all three approaches
(BK, DFF and FP [our method ]) in Section VI.
C) Endogeneity in Investment Regressions
A potential problem with our analogy to healthy and sick people, some of whom are treated,
is the choice of who receives the treatment. In a laboratory experiment, it can be random. In the case
of the AJCA, firms choose to repatriate income under the AJCA. To understand how the issue of
endogeneity arises in our context, we need to review how endogeneity can affect how the coefficient
estimate is interpreted (α in equation 7). With traditional investment/cash flow panel regressions,
the coefficient on the cash flow variable can measure two distinct effects. If there is no change in
investment opportunities or investment opportunities have been controlled for (e.g. X in equation
7), then the cash flow coefficient measures a supply effect. Increases in cash flow relax the capital
constraint and allow firms to fund projects they otherwise have been unable to fund. This is the
interpretation we are testing in this paper. Does lowering the cost of repatriating capital increase the
firm’s investment by increasing the firm’s access to lower cost capital? Alternatively, the coefficient
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it it it i t it Investment X CF         (7)9 At the time of adoption, it was stated that the tax holiday would be a one time event. However, if firms
expected it to be repeated in the future, it would lower the present value of taxes on foreign investments in countries with
low tax rates and thus make these investment more viable. It would not change the taxation of domestic investment. We
return to this issue in footnote 22.
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The standard solution to this problem has been to find a source of variation in cash flow
which is uncorrelated with changes in investment opportunities (see for example Lamont (1997) and
Rauh (2006)). This is the advantage of the AJCA experiment. The change in the law did not change
the firm’s domestic investment opportunities.
9 Thus the coefficient we estimate (α in equation 7) can
be interpreted as a supply effect as long as we convince the reader that it does not arise due to a
change in investment opportunities. We will return to this issue once we have the empirical results.
At that point, we will explain what must be true for our results to be driven by changes in investment
opportunities (demand for capital) as opposed to being drive by relaxation of the funding constraint
(supply of capital, see Section VI-A-2).
In the prior literature (e.g. Lamont (1997) and Rauh (2006)), all cash flow is internal to the
firm and all cash flow can thus be used to fund any investment (e.g. the money is in the firm's
universally accessible checking account). This is not true in our experiment. Foreign capital cannot
fund domestic investments if it is not repatriated. A firm with significant foreign earnings can only
use the foreign capital to fund domestic investments if they choose to repatriate the capital. We are
asking a different question than the traditional investment-cash flow literature. We are not asking
whether a firm with more foreign earnings invests more after the passage of the AJCA, independent
of whether they repatriate (the approach used in DFF). Instead, we are asking whether repatriating
income under the AJCA relaxes the capital constraint for some firms and thus results in an increase
in investment that would otherwise have been foregone. Since we are asking a different question,
our empirical approach must differ as well. We need to control for the presence of unrepatriated
foreign earnings and then examine how behavior (e.g. investment or equity payouts) changes due
to this exogenous shock to the cost of internal funds.
IV) Repatriation of Foreign Earnings: Data and Summary Statistics10 According to aggregate IRS data, the total repatriations under the AJCA was $312B, or 14B more than we
found (Browning, 2008). However, the IRS number includes private firms which we cannot include. Thus our sample
includes the vast majority of the capital repatriated under the AJCA (95 percent). The IRS also recorded an additional
$50B which was repatriated during this period but which did not qualify for the reduced tax rate under the AJCA.
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A) AJCA Repatriation Data
Information on a firm’s repatriation of foreign earnings is not available in standard data sets
(e.g. Compustat). Thus, to analyze the effects of the AJCA, we collected data directly from the
firms’ 10-Ks. We searched the firms’ 10-Ks for discussions of the AJCA using a Perl script and then
read the relevant paragraphs. Although the law was passed in October of 2004, and thus firms could
begin repatriating under the lower tax rate immediately, many firms waited for additional regulations
to be released by the Treasury. Additional regulations and guidance were released in February, May,
and September of 2005. Thus, we searched firm’s 10Ks from 2004, 2005, and 2006.  The firms in
our sample reported repatriating foreign income under the AJCA from the fourth quarter of 2004 to
the fourth quarter of 2006 (the quarter of the 10-K filing). Two-thirds of the repatriations were
reported in the fiscal year ending in the fourth quarter of 2005, and almost 20 percent of firms that
reported repatriating income under the AJCA did so in 2006.
We found 1,246 firms that discussed the repatriation provisions of the AJCA in at least one
year. In some cases, the 10-K would discuss the tax incentives introduced by the AJCA, but
conclude that the firm had decided not to repatriate income that year. In the following year, the firm
would either not mention the AJCA, disclose that they would not repatriate income under the AJCA,
or announce that they had chosen to repatriate income under the AJCA. Based on the text of the 10-
Ks, we tried to classify firms into the three groups discussed above (see Table I). 804 firms
discussed the repatriation provisions of the AJCA in their 10K but did not repatriate foreign income
under the AJCA (possibly Group 2) and 442 firms repatriated income under the AJCA (Group 3).
The remaining firms did not mention the repatriation provisions of the AJCA in their 10Ks. All but
19 of the 442 repatriators disclosed the amount of their repatriation. The total repatriation by these
423 firms was $298B.
1011 Not all firms which report they have permanently reinvested foreign earnings, report the actual number. A
small number of firms reported the incremental tax which would be due upon repatriation, but not the stock of PRE. In
this case, we divided the incremental tax by 0.35 as specified in the AJCA. The numbers we report on total permanently
reinvested earnings is thus based on the firms that report either the stock of permanently reinvested earnings or the
incremental tax.
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B) Permanently Reinvested Foreign Earnings Data
 A firm’s ability to take advantage of the low tax rate in the AJCA depends upon their stock
of unrepatriated foreign earnings. To measure firms’ unrepatriated earnings we read the tax notes
in the firms’ 10-Ks from 2001 to 2005 and collected the permanently reinvested foreign earnings
(PRE) which they reported. Although only twenty percent of the firms in our sample report having
foreign income that was permanently reinvested abroad, the amount of the unrepatriated foreign
earnings is large. Over the five years from 2001 to 2005, the total amount of permanently reinvested
foreign earnings held by the firms in our sample grew from $350B in 2001 to a peak of $628B in
2004, and then fell to $546B in 2005 (see Figure 1).
11 The amount of permanently reinvested
earnings is a useful, although imperfect, measure of unrepatriated foreign earnings. Firms with no
foreign operations, or whose foreign subsidiary has not yet become profitable, will obviously not
have any permanently reinvested foreign earnings. However, even after we condition on the firm
having foreign operations (defined as having positive foreign income or paying foreign taxes), the
probability of reporting PRE rises to only 58 percent (see Figure 1). Firms can have unrepatriated
foreign earnings and not declare them as permanently reinvested abroad, but then they must report
a deferred tax liability if the US tax rate is above the foreign rate (see Section II-A). Thus firms are
more likely to classify foreign earnings as permanently reinvested abroad when the foreign tax rate
is low and the benefits to repatriation under the AJCA are greater (Albring, Dzuranin, and Mills,
2005). This means that when we try to predict who will repatriate their foreign income under the
AJCA, we will need to measure the amount of unrepatriated foreign earnings in two ways: the firm’s
current and recent history of foreign profits, as well as the stock of foreign profits that are classified
as permanently reinvested abroad.
C) Characteristics of Firms that Repatriated Income under the AJCA19
Since how firms allocate the repatriated capital will depend upon firm characteristics (e.g.
whether they are capital constrained), it is useful to first examine which types of firm repatriated
income under the AJCA. Although the firms that repatriated income come from 144 different
industries (3-digit SIC), repatriation is concentrated among a smaller set of industries. First, only
firms with significant foreign operations will be included in this sample. Secondly, conditional on
having foreign operations the firms that repatriate are more likely to have subsidiaries located in
low-tax jurisdictions. Thus, firms whose location decision is less restricted by business constraints
are more likely to appear among these firms. The top ten industries in terms of total dollars
repatriated under the AJCA are listed in Table II, along with the total amount of the repatriation and
total amount of permanently reinvested earnings by firms in that industry. At the top of the list is
Drugs with more than $104.5 billion in repatriations coming from 26 companies. A large component
of the earnings generated in Drugs comes from the patents on their pharmaceuticals; earnings that
can be more easily located in subsidiaries in countries with lower corporate income tax rates. Other
industries that similarly have a large component of their earnings arise from intellectual capital also
rank high on total industry repatriations. Repatriations total $28B in the Computer and Office
Equipment industry and $19B in the Computer Programming industry. Other large industries such
as airlines and utilities are not on the list as they have minimal overseas operations.
Firms which repatriated income under the AJCA are different from those that did not on
several dimensions (see Table III). The first thing to notice is that the firms that repatriate income
have higher market-to-book ratios than the other firms which is consistent with these firms relying
predominantly on intangible assets, which is what we saw in the industry results in Table II. Firms
which repatriate are also larger (as measured by assets, sales, or employment), more profitable
(higher EBIT to asset ratios), have significantly lower cash positions (consistent with them having
greater access to capital markets (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 1999)), and make greater
payments to shareholders (dividends and repurchases). These are not characteristics normally
associated with capital constrained firms. Instead, these results suggest that the firms that took12 In the investment regressions which follow, we define our measure of profits as prior to investment
expenditure. Prior research examined investment in property, plant, and equipment, so EBIT or EBITDA was used. Since
the AJCA list of acceptable investment includes R&D and advertising, we define our pre-investment profits as EBITDA
plus advertising and R&D.
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advantage of the Act are exactly the ones that would theoretically generate the least incremental
domestic investment. The kind of firms that are able to establish and sustain profitable foreign
subsidiaries on average generate more internal funds and have better access to external funds. These
are the results that lead Blouin and Krull to conclude that the average repatriating firm is not capital
constrained. However, this is also why we must examine both the response of the average firm as
well as the response of firms we expect to be most constrained in the empirical work which follows.
The averages do not tell the whole story.
V) Who Repatriates Foreign Income under the AJCA
A) Firm Characteristics and Unrepatriated Foreign Income
Before examining how repatriation of foreign income under the AJCA alters the real and
financial decisions of the firm, we first examine which firm characteristics are associated with the
likelihood of repatriating under the AJCA. Since theory predicts a different reaction among
constrained and unconstrained firms, we are particularly interested in which subset of firms was
more likely to take advantage of the repatriation opportunity. In addition, we need to partition the
sample into those firms which are likely to repatriate income under the AJCA versus those that are
unlikely (i.e. partition Groups 2 & 3 from Group 1). To do this, we estimate a cross-sectional model
of who repatriates foreign income under the AJCA (in 2004 to 2006) based on firm level data from
2003 and before. We use three sets of variables to predict repatriation. We first include firm
characteristics such as the firm’s size (market value of assets), the firm’s market-to-book ratio, and
the firm’s pre-investment profitability.
12 There are two reasons to include these variables. First, since
these variables will be included in later regressions (e.g. investment), we want to include them in
the regression that predicts repatriation as well. This way the coefficient on predicted repatriation
in the investment regression will measure variation in the ability to, and benefit of, repatriating21
under the AJCA (i.e. variation in the supply of foreign income in low tax jurisdictions). Secondly,
we are interested in how these variables, which are correlated with a firm’s access to capital, predict
the firm’s decision to repatriate income. Remember, the implicit financial assumption of the AJCA
is that some firms are capital constrained, and the tax subsidy embedded in the AJCA will lower the
cost of internal funds (from their foreign subsidiary), enabling them to take projects that they
otherwise would not.
The second set of explanatory variables measures the firm’s stock of unrepatriated foreign
earnings. These are the funds that the Congress was targeting with the AJCA. This analysis will help
us distinguish between the supply of foreign funds and the demand by firms to repatriate foreign
income under the new tax regime, given they did not repatriate the income under the prior tax
regime. We use two measures of unrepatriated foreign earnings. First, we include the log of one plus
the firm’s permanently reinvested foreign earnings which we hand collected from their 10Ks . Firms
may have unrepatriated foreign earnings which they do not classify as PRE (see Section IV-B). To
account for the unrepatriated foreign earnings of these firms, we also calculate the sum of foreign
earnings for the last three years and include the log of one plus this sum in the analysis. Using a two
or four year average produces economically similar but statistically weaker results. This variable has
the advantage of including the stock of foreign earnings which are not classified as permanently
reinvested abroad. The disadvantage is these foreign earnings may have come from years prior to
our three year window, or these earnings may have already been repatriated, a problem which does
not arise with our measure of permanently reinvested foreign earnings. Since neither variable is
perfect, but their flaws are non-overlapping, we will include both in our analysis (the correlation
between the two is 0.70). For both measures of unrepatriated earnings, we also include a dummy
variable which is equal to one if the variable is greater than zero, and zero otherwise. This allows
for a discontinuity at zero.
The final set of variables measure the tax benefit of repatriation. As we discussed in Section
II-A, the smaller the foreign tax rate relative to the US tax rate, the greater the incentive to postpone13 As Unocal Corp noted in their December, 2005 10-K, when the foreign tax rate is above the domestic tax
rate, the marginal advantage of repatriation under the AJCA is zero. “Because we incur a foreign tax rate in excess of
the 35 percent U.S. federal income tax rate, we do not pay incremental federal income tax on our foreign earnings due
to excess foreign tax credits. Therefore, we do not anticipate repatriating higher amounts of foreign earnings under the
Act since any such repatriations do not reduce federal income taxes.”
14 “Under the Act, net operating loss carry forwards could not be used to offset the repatriated income subject
to U.S. tax, consequently we did not utilize this one-time incentive.” [Navistar International Corp, October, 2005 10-K].
“Due to the availability of net operating loss (NOL) carry forwards in the U.S., we have not and do not intend to avail
ourselves of the provisions of the AJCA for any repatriations of accumulated income. While it has been our historical
practice to permanently reinvest all foreign earnings into our foreign operations, in 2005 we repatriated approximately
$48 million from our foreign subsidiaries. Repatriation of these earnings did not result in any significant incremental
charge to our income tax provision as a result of utilizing U.S. NOL carry forwards for which we had previously
maintained a full valuation allowance.” Parametric Technology Corp, September, 2005, 10-K]. Parametric repatriated
income but not under the AJCA. Thus their repatriation is coded as zero in our analysis.
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repatriation of foreign earnings (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2007) and the greater the tax benefit of
repatriating under the AJCA. To measure the relative tax incentive for repatriating under the AJCA,
we compared the taxes that would have been paid on the foreign income had it been taxed in the US
at 35 percent to the actual foreign taxes paid. This is the dollar tax that would be due upon
repatriation for the current year’s (2003) foreign earnings.
13 We then scale this number by the market
value of assets. This variable captures both the difference in the foreign and domestic tax rate, and
also the magnitude of foreign income. If the foreign income is very small, then the actual tax savings
will be small even if the tax rates differ appreciably. This is the same tax variable that is used in
Foley et. al. (2007). They find that firms with a large tax wedge keep a larger fraction of their cash
in foreign subsidiaries. We also include the firm’s unused tax loss carry forwards as this would
reduce the tax cost of repatriation under the original law. Some firms choose not to repatriate their
income under the AJCA due to their tax loss carry forwards.
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B) Repatriation Decision: Empirical Results
We report the results of which firms choose to repatriate foreign income under the AJCA in
Table IV, and there are several results worth noting. We first examine the firm characteristics. The
firms which repatriate are the largest firms with the greatest sources of internal cash flow (as
measured by pre-investment profits/assets) and the smallest investment opportunities (as measured
by the market-to-book ratio). Based on the literature on capital rationing (Whited (1992), Kashyap,
Lamont, and Stein (1994), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach15 We alternatively standardized the foreign income variables by the book value or the market value of assets.
The predicted probability of repatriation across the different models have correlations of at least 0.98.
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(2004), and Faulkender and Petersen (2006)), these are the firms that we would expect to be the least
capital constrained (see Table IV – column I). In addition to being statistically significant, the
economic magnitude of these effects is large. For example, increasing firm size from the 25
th to the
75
th percentile (e.g. from $110M to $2.0B) raises the probability of repatriation by 3.5 percent, while
increasing pre-investment profits from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile raises the probability of
repatriation by 2.8 percent. Given that the base line probability is 8 percent, these are large effects.
The most powerful predictors of whether a firm repatriates foreign earnings under the AJCA
is their supply of unrepatriated foreign earnings. Firms with the largest stock of permanently
reinvested foreign earnings (PRE) are the most likely to repatriate those earnings under the AJCA.
Both the presence of PRE and the actual magnitude of these earnings predict repatriation behavior.
Comparing a firm that has zero permanently reinvested foreign earnings to one that has a positive,
but very small PRE, the second firm’s probability of repatriating under the AJCA is 12.6% higher
(see Table IV, column II). If we then raise the amount of permanently reinvested foreign earnings
by one standard deviation, the probability of repatriation rises by an additional 2.1 percent.
Not all firms with unrepatriated foreign earnings report them as PRE (see Section IV-B). Our
second measure of unrepatriated foreign earnings (the sum of the last three years of foreign earnings)
has incremental explanatory power in the model. Increasing this measure of unrepatriated earnings
by one standard deviation raises the probability of repatriation by 1.1 percent.
15 It makes sense that
the explanatory power of PRE should be greater, since firms are more likely to classify foreign
earnings as permanently reinvested abroad if the foreign tax rate is low (Collins, Hand, and
Shackelford, 2001, Krull, 2004). In this way, they can avoid declaring a deferred tax liability.
The last set of variables in our model measure the relative tax advantage of repatriating
income under the AJCA versus the prior law. The variable Estimated Repatriation Tax estimates the
marginal tax payment that would be due upon repatriation of the foreign income to the US. For firms16 For firms with foreign earnings, this variable is defined as 35% (the statutory corporate tax rate) times the
firm’s foreign earnings in 2003 minus their foreign taxes paid in 2003. We divide this number by the market value of
assets to standardize for firm size. Alternatively, we could have used the effective marginal tax rates from Graham (1996)
as the marginal tax rate on domestic income. This approach could be more accurate as it accounts for variation in the
marginal domestic tax rate across firms. It may also be less accurate, as some of the variation in the estimated marginal
tax rates is due to variation in the firm’s tax rate on foreign income and whether it has foreign income. Since we want
to measure the difference between domestic and foreign tax rate for the firm, we do not want to include this variation.
To check the explanatory power of this alternative measure, we calculated the estimated repatriation tax using both
Graham's before- and after-interest expense marginal tax rates. The predicted probabilities across the three measures are
highly correlated (greater than 0.99) and the results which follow in later tables are essentially identical.
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with no foreign earnings, this variable is zero.
16 An increase in the tax wedge from the 25
th to the 75
th
percentile of the distribution, conditional on the tax wedge being positive, raises the probability of
repatriation by 1.1 percent (Table IV, column II). We also find that firms with larger tax loss carry
forwards (scaled by the market value of assets) are significantly less like to repatriate income.
Moving the size of the carry forwards from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile lowers the probability of
repatriation by 3.4 percent.
C) Alternative Specifications of the Repatriation Decision
In addition, to the logit model, we also estimated a tobit model using the actual repatriation
amount (Table IV, column III). The economic effect of the variables is very similar across the two
specifications. A simple way to compare the models is to compare the index that underlies both the
logit and tobit model (e.g. Xβ where Pr[Repatriation] = 1/[1+exp(-X β)] in the case of the logit
model). The correlation of the two indexes is 0.98. We lose some of the observations when we use
the tobit model (4 percent of the repatriating firms do not report the actual repatriation amount).
Given the loss of data and the high correlation in the underlying indexes, we will use the binary
choice results to partitioning the sample between Group 1 and Group 2 & 3 in the next section.
The key to our empirical strategy is to partition the sample into the three groups described
in Section III and Table I. When we hand collected the data from a firm’s 10-Ks, we tried to classify
it into one of three groups: firms that repatriated foreign income under the AJCA, firms that
considered repatriating foreign income under the AJCA but chose not to, and firms that did not
consider the AJCA (i.e. do not mention the law’s repatriation provisions in their 10-Ks). To test the
accuracy of our classification, we estimated an ordered logit model based on our three way25
classification. The results are reported in column IV of Table IV. Although most of the results are
similar (the coefficient on the market-to-book ratio does switch signs and loses statistical
significance), many of the coefficients are smaller and the explanatory power of the ordered logit
model is significantly lower (the pseudo-R drops from 0.45 to 0.37). We think the problem lies with
the second group of firms: those which we classified as considering repatriation under the AJCA but
did not. Some firms with unrepatriated earnings in low tax jurisdictions do not discuss the AJCA
in their 10-Ks. Other firm may include a discussion of the AJCA in their 10-K as part of a boiler
plate disclosure instead of a serious consideration of the law. For example, Compudyne Corporation,
which reports no foreign earnings in Compustat during our sample period, discussed the AJCA and
the associated accounting treatment, then state that these provisions “...will have no effect on the
financial position, results of operations, or cash flows of the Company.” In the subsequent empirical
work, we will therefore rely on the data (e.g. firm’s stock of unrepatriated foreign earnings, the
estimated probability of repatriation from Table IV, and the firm’s repatriation decisions) to classify
firms into the three groups.
VI) The Real and Financial Impact of Repatriating Income under the AJCA
A) Effect on Approved Investment
1) Difference-in-Difference Estimation
We begin by examining the AJCA’s effect on firm investment. The dependent variable in
the regression is approved investment under the AJCA divided by the book value of assets. To match
the limits of the law as closely as possible (see Section II-B), we include domestic capital
expenditure, domestic research and development expenditure, total advertising expense, and
acquisitions in our measure of investment. The geographic segment files allow us to observe
domestic capital expenditure and advertising expense. For the other components, we only observe
firm totals (e.g. research and development and acquisitions).
The empirical challenge is to compare the level of investment when a firm repatriated income
under the law to the level of investment the firm would have made in the absence of the law change.17 We report standard errors clustered by firm in Table V. We also calculated White standard errors and
standard errors clustered by year and by both firm and year to better understand the data. When the regression is run
without firm dummies (the coefficient estimate is 2.4 percent), the standard error of the repatriation dummy is 31 percent
larger when clustered by firm compared to White standard errors (results available from the authors). This is evidence
of an unobserved and unaccounted for firm effect (see Petersen (2009) for details) and one reason the firm dummies are
required. Once firm dummies are included (e.g. Table V – column I), standard errors clustered by firm are only slightly
larger than the White standard errors (3 percent). Clustering by time reduces the standard errors slightly. Thus, once firm
and time dummies are included, there is very little unobserved firm or time effects remaining in the residuals.
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In this paper, and in the prior literature, a difference in difference (DID) regression approach is used.
We measure the effect of the law on investment by comparing changes in the repatriating firm’s
investment following their repatriation (treated group) to changes in the investment by other firms
(untreated group). The regressions include both a firm dummy (μi) and a time dummy (λt). By
including firm dummies, we are comparing the change in investment of firms which repatriated
foreign income (before versus after) relative to the change in investment of the firms that did not
repatriate. We are effectively using each firm as a control for itself. As additional controls, we also
included the firm’s size (log of market value of assets), the market-to-book ratio, and the pre-
investment profits (EBITDA plus advertising and R&D expenditure over assets) and a set of time
dummies in the regressions. These are the variables that were commonly used in prior investment
regressions (Fazarri, Hubbard, and Peterson (1988), Kaplan and Zingales (2000), Baker, Stein, and
Wurgler (2003), and Rauh (2006) for example). 
We estimate the three versions of the DID regression discussed in Section III (see equation
6). The method used in Clemons and Kinney (2007), Brennan (2008), and Blouin and Krull (2009),
including an AJCA dummy variable, is reported in Table V, column I. The estimated increase in
investment using this method is small, 0.2 percent, and statistically insignificant (p-value =0.63).
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The method used by Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes (2011) is reported in column II of Table V. In
this case, the AJCA dummy variable is replaced by the predicted probability of repatriation for each
firm in the years 2004 and after (based on the coefficient estimate from Table IV, column II). Prior
to 2004, the effective date of the law, the probability of repatriation under the AJCA is zero and thus
we set our predicted probability to zero. The estimated increase in investment is now slightly
negative, -0.5 percent, and still statistically insignificant (p-value=0.27). 18 Both the BK and DFF method can be viewed as a restricted version of our model (see equation 6). The BK
model effectively assumes that the coefficient on the predicted probability of repatriation and the residual are equal (α1=
α2). The DFF model effectively assumes that the coefficient on residual or the AJCA dummy variable is zero once the
predicted probability of repatriation is included in the regression (see equation 6). As we will see, both of these
hypothesized coefficient restrictions are rejected by the data once we examine capital constrained and unconstrained
firms separately.
19 To convince oneself that the coefficient on the residual is the correct metric, compare two firms. Assume they
have the same value for the independent variables and the same predicted probability of repatriation. The regression will
account for these differences when this is not true. The first firm repatriates foreign income under the AJCA (first line
of the equation), and the second does not (second line of the equation). The increase in investment due to repatriation,
holding both firm characteristics and the predicted probability of repatriation constant is α2.
       
    
   
12 i t it it it
12 i t it it it
it 2 2 it it
Investment Repatriatingfirm =α Pr Repat +α 1-Pr Repat +βX
Investment Non-repatriatingfirm =α Pr Repat +α 0-Pr Repat +βX




As we explained in Section III, neither of these approaches measures the change in
investment among the firms which repatriated under the AJCA versus those that did not, holding
foreign earnings in low tax jurisdictions (i.e. the probability of repatriation) constant. The method
in column I (the BK method) cannot determine whether the measured effect arises due to repatriation
or due to the presence of tax advantaged foreign earnings. The method in column II (the DFF
method) assumes that the change in investment, conditional on the probability of repatriation is the
same whether the firm repatriates or not. This makes it impossible to estimate the effect of
repatriation since it is assumed to be zero. This is why we need to estimate the model with both the
predicted probability of repatriation as well as the residual.
18 The results are reported in Table V,
column III. The coefficient on the predicted probability (α1 in equation (6)) measures the difference
in the change in domestic investment between group 1 (e.g. no foreign earnings) and groups 2 and
3 combined (e.g. a large stock of foreign earnings). The coefficient on the residual (α2) is the one
we are interested in. This coefficient measures the incremental increase in investment for firms that
did repatriate relative to those that did not, holding firm characteristics and the probability of
repatriation  constant.
19 Repatriation under the AJCA, holding the probability of repatriation
constant, increases domestic investment by a statistically insignificant 0.37 percent of assets. For
the average firm, there is essentially no increase in investment due to repatriating income under the28
AJCA.
2) Effects of Capital Constraints
According to finance theory, the law should only increase the investment of firms which are
capital constrained. Unconstrained firms have already optimized their investment decision. For these
firms, the AJCA provides a reduction in the repatriation tax, but should not alter their investment
behavior. This is why we need to examine not just the behavioral response of the average firm, but
the change in investment behavior of those firms which are capital constrained.
To calculate a simple measure of capital constraints by which we can classify firms prior to
the passage of the AJCA (e.g. 2000 to 2003), we calculate the percent of years during which each
firm’s internal cash flow was insufficient to finance their investment. We defined this as earnings
after taxes (which will also be after advertising and R&D) but prior to interest minus capital
expenditures. 56 percent of repatriating firms were able to fully fund their investment internally all
four years so for them our capital constrained variable takes the value zero. For 11 percent of
repatriating firms, their investment exceeded their internal cash flow each of the four years, so for
those firms, our capital constrained variable takes the value one.  All other firms have values strictly
between zero and one.  We then interacted this percentage with the residual. This allows us to
compare how constrained and unconstrained firms’ investment responds when they repatriate
foreign income, holding the unrepatriated foreign earnings (probability of repatriation) constant.
The results are reported in Table V – column IV. We now find a large difference in the
investment rates among the firms. Firms whose internal cash flow was always sufficient to fund their
investments, decrease their investment slightly (-0.4 percent) following their decision to repatriate
their foreign income. The change is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.22). Firms whose
internal cash flow was never sufficient to fund their investment increase their investment
significantly. Their investment rate rises by 2.6 percent of book assets more per year than the
unconstrained firms. This is much larger than the effects we found above, is large relative to the20 Since the logit specification we used in Table IV is a non-linear function of the independent variables in Table
IV, we checked the importance of this functional form assumption. Using a linear probability model to predict the
probability of repatriation, raises the predicted investment response of constrained firms from the 2.6% found in Table
V (column IV) to 3.1% (t-statistics = 3.3, results available from authors). Since a linear probability model can, and in
our case does, generate negative predicted probabilities and our current estimate of the impact of repatriation on the
investment of capital constrained firms is conservative, we use a logit first stage in our reported results.
21 We tried a number of alternative measures of whether a firm was capital constrained and interacted each with
our cash flow deficit variable (i.e. the firm is below the median size, the firm does not pay a dividend, or the value of
the Whited-Wu measure of financial constraints is above the median). The estimated coefficients were uniformly large
and statistically significant. Absent the interaction with our cash flow deficit variable, the coefficients are not always
statistically significant. This points out the importance of controlling for whether firms are able to generate sufficient
internal funds to finance their investment. Results are available in the online appendix.
22 The capital constrained firms do not offset foreign investment with domestic investment. Constrained firms
reduce their foreign investment by less than 0.1% of assets and the coefficient is statistically insignificant. Graham,
Hanlon, and Shevlin (2010) survey results do not find that firms liquidate foreign assets to fund repatriations.
23 When estimated in first differences, we still find a significant increase in investment for capital constrained
firms, although the coefficients are smaller. The coefficient shrinks from 0.0257 (Table V, column IV) to 0.0214 (t=1.9)
and from 0.0374 (Table V, column V) to 0.0282 (t=1.7). The smaller coefficient should be expected when it takes more
than a year to deploy the repatriated capital. In this case, the first difference coefficient should be biased toward zero (see
the online appendix).
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average investment rate in our sample (7.2 percent), and is statistically significant (t=2.7).
20
Firms that are unable to fund their investments internally can in theory turn to the external
capital markets. Firms without a bond rating have less credit market access according to prior
research (see Faulkender and Petersen, 2006). A second version of our test is to interact the variable
that measures the fraction of years in which a firm was unable to fund its investment internally with
a dummy variable that equals one if the firm does not have a bond rating.
21 This measures a possible
shortage of both internal and external capital to fund positive NPV projects. A smaller number of
firms are capital rationed by this measure, but the magnitude of the effect is larger. The investment
rate for firms that are rationed and repatriate income rises by 3.7 percent more than unconstrained
firms (t=2.1, see Table V, column V).
22 These results indicate that while the average repatriating firm
did not significantly increase domestic investment, the repatriating firms who were most likely
constrained did significantly increase investment.
23
Before proceeding, we want to revisit the endogeneity discussion in Section III-C and explain
under what conditions our results could be misleading. Consider what must be true about the world
for us to get a positive coefficient on the residual times capital constrained variable, and yet24 Including this variable does effect the estimated investment response. Dropping the post-2003 capital
constrained variable increases the coefficient on the residual times capital constrained from 2.57% (Table V, column IV)
to 3.21%  and from 3.74% (Table V, column V) to 4.13% .Results available in the online appendix.
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constrained firms are not increasing their investment as a result of repatriation relaxing this
constraint. Our results do not arise because the constrained repatriators have higher average
investment rates. This effect would be absorbed by the firm dummies. Our results do not arise
because investment opportunities are higher in the latter half of the sample than the first when
repatriation under the AJCA becomes feasible. This effect would be absorbed by the time dummies.
Our results do not arise because investment opportunities of firms with foreign earnings or capital
constrained firms increases in the latter half of the sample relative to the first half, but independently
of the firm’s decision to repatriate. The first effect is controlled for by including the predicted
probability of repatriation (which is positive only after 2003) in the regression. As we will see in
Section VI-D this variable explains the changes in payout policy that prior work incorrectly attributed
to the repatriation decision. The second effect is controlled for by including a variable which is zero
prior to 2004 and equal to our measure of capital constraints after 2003. This variable will control
for any change in investment rates of capital constrained firms relative to unconstrained firms post
2003 relative to pre-2004.
24 By including this elaborate set of controls, our measured increase in
investment occurs only in firms who are capital constrained, have unrepatriated foreign earnings and
only if they repatriate. Are these firms which had greater unfunded domestic investments and is this
why they repatriated? Yes. The fact that some firms with unrepatriated foreign earnings had greater
investment opportunities isn’t a problem for the empirical method, it is a requirement. Given only
capital constrained firms should increase investment when a capital constraint is relaxed, finance
theory argues this is the only way in which the law could increase the level of domestic investment.
3) Estimation on a Restricted Sample
Our empirical strategy has been driven by the need to compare the investment changes in
firms which do and do not repatriate, controlling for their ability and likelihood of repatriating. An
alternative estimation strategy would be to drop firms which are unlikely to repatriate income (i.e.25 Our two measures of unrepatriated foreign earnings are good but not perfect. Among firms which have zero
unrepatriated foreign earnings by both measures, the probability of repatriation is very low, but not zero (0.4%). In
addition, since the likelihood of repatriation is a continuous function of the tax advantages of repatriation as well as the
presence of foreign earnings (see Table IV), the division between likely and unlikely to repatriate is not discrete. We
thus use the probability model to account for this continuity.
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zero foreign earnings). By focusing only on those firms that are able to participate in the repatriation
provisions of the AJCA (e.g. Groups 2 & 3 from Table I), one can directly examine the difference
in investment between those that repatriate (Group 3) and those that do not (Group 2). Among firms
able to take advantage of the AJCA tax subsidy, did those that actually repatriated increase
investment more than those that did not?
We proceed by first demonstrating that our earlier results are not driven by those firms for
whom the AJCA tax subsidies are not valuable. First, we drop observations where the probability of
repatriation is less than the median probability. In Table VI, column II we report the regression from
Table V for this sub-sample (column I is the result from Table V and is reported for comparison). In
the second sub-sample, we included only observations where the firm had positive foreign earnings
by either of our measures (see column III). Our results are little changed from those of the full
sample. Capital constrained firms increase their investment by 2.4 to 2.5% per year in the years
following repatriation (versus 2.6% in the full sample). The standard errors change very little as well.
The results do not change across samples when we define capital constrained firms as those who are
cash flow poor and do not have a bond rating (see columns IV & V).
In the last two columns of Table VI, we examine the two restricted samples, but instead of
including the predicted probability of repatriation and the residual, we include only the repatriation
dummy variable plus the dummy variable interacted with our measure of capital constraints (e.g. the
BK method). These estimates thus do not depend upon the probability model in Table IV. We again
find very consistent results. The increase in investment due to repatriation is concentrated among the
capital constrained firms, and the magnitude of the increase is very similar (2.3% and 2.9% in the sub-
samples versus 2.6% in the full sample).
25 Across a set of different specifications and samples, we find
a consistent increase in investment among firms that repatriate, but only among the firms which are32
capital constrained.
4) Magnitude of the Investment Response
For each firm that repatriated, we estimate the increase in the investment rate due to repatriation
based on the coefficient estimates in Table V, column IV (see equation 9).
The average rise in investment across the repatriating firms is 0.17%. When we restrict this calculation
to the sample of firms which are capital constrained, the average rise in the investment rate is 1.85%.
To convert this investment rate to a dollar amount, we multiplied the predicted increase in the
investment rate by the firm’s book value of assets and sum across all the post repatriation years. Firms
classified as capital constrained increased their domestic approved investment by $61.5B, which is 78
percent of the amount that these firms repatriated ($78.3B). The constrained firms, however, accounted
for only 27% percent of the total amount repatriated in our sample. For the unconstrained firms, the
predicted change in the investment rate is slightly negative and not statistically different from zero (see
Table V, column IV). Using the estimates from column V of Table V, the results are similar.
B) Effect on Employment
As the name suggests, the American Jobs Creation Act was intended to create incentives for
firms to increase employment or increase expenditure on hiring and training as well as domestic
investment. While we have documented that constrained firms increased their investment following
repatriation under the act, and clearly Congress intended greater employment to accompany greater
levels of investment, the potential substitutability of labor and capital does not mean that higher
employment will necessarily result, even at the constrained firms. It is therefore an empirical question.
Using our method, we find reductions in employment among both the constrained and unconstrained
firms (see online appendix). Neither of these effects is statistically significant. We also find reductions
in employment which are statistically insignificant using the BK and DFF methods as well. The data
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(9)26 To demonstrate the coefficient on the probability of repatriation is due to a different trend, we replace this
variable with a set of year dummies interacted with the probability of repatriation. The standard set of year dummies are
still included. In this way, we can estimate different non-parametric trends for the two groups of firms (high and low
probability of repatriation). The coefficients on the second set of year dummies, the difference in the trends, is plotted
in Figure 2. From the figure, it is clear that the decline in leverage of the firms with a high probability versus a low
probability of repatriation occurs over the entire sample period and is unrelated to the passage of the AJCA or to a firm's
decision to repatriate income under the law. If we estimate the model using first differences, the coefficient on the
probability of repatriation drops by over fifty percent. A more complete discussion of different trends and DID
regressions is contained in the online appendix.
33
is unable to provide a precise answer.
C) Effect on Financial Structure: Leverage 
The last set of firm responses to the AJCA we examine are financial: leverage and payout
policy. As with investment, we estimate all three DID regression models (BK, DFF, and ours) and
examine the effect on both capital constrained and unconstrained firms. The results for leverage are
reported in Table VII. When we examine both leverage (debt to the market value of assets) and net debt
(debt minus cash to the market value of assets), we find that neither constrained nor unconstrained
firms change their leverage or cash levels due to repatriation (see columns IV-VI). Given firms only
publicly disclose firm-wide figures, we are unable to track the location of the debt and cash. However,
our empirical results are consistent with firms moving their foreign cash home and/or moving their debt
abroad (the foreign subsidiary borrows and parent repatriates the cash which is then used to pay down
the firm’s domestic debt) with no change in the total amount of cash or debt.
The coefficient on the predicted probability of repatriation is large and statistically significant
(t=3.2 in column II). As we explained in Section III-B, this coefficient does not measure the effect of
repatriation, but the change in leverage (pre- versus post-2004) for firms with a high probability of
repatriation relative to those with a low probability. In the case of leverage, this variable is measuring
a trend in leverage that is different for firms with and without unrepatriated foreign earnings.
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D) Effect on Financial Structure: Payout Policy
Payments to equity holders have been the focus of the prior work on the AJCA. Blouin and
Krull (2009) found that firms spent 50 percent of their repatriations on payments to shareholders, while
Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes (2011) found that firms spent over 90% of their repatriation on27 A way to verify that the coefficient on the probability of repatriation does not inform us about the effects of
repatriation, is to re-run the regression in column II dropping the observations for firms which repatriated income under
the AJCA (i.e. Group 3). If we run the regression using only data on firms that did not repatriate, the coefficient on the
probability of repatriation is essentially unchanged: 0.0193 (full sample) versus 0.0195 (only non-repatriating firms).
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payments to shareholders. We are able to replicate their methods in Table VIII. The BK method
(column I) shows an increase in equity payouts (β=0.0063) which is statistically significant (t=3.3).
Using the DFF method (i.e. replacing the AJCA dummy with the probability of repatriation) leads to
an even larger coefficient (β = 0.0193, t=6.8). The problem is neither of these methods examine the
effect of repatriation on a firm’s payout policy (see Section III-B). To examine the effect of
repatriation, we must include both the probability of repatriation and the residual (see column III).
From this result, it is clear that firms with a greater probability of repatriation (e.g. a larger stock of
unrepatriated foreign earnings in low tax jurisdictions) increase their equity payouts after 2003.
However, after conditioning on the probability of repatriation, actually repatriating earnings under the
AJCA has almost no effect on payout. The coefficient is small (β=0.0015) and implies that only 9.6%
of the repatriated funds went to dividends and repurchases. This increase is not statistically different
from zero.
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To demonstrate that the increases in equity payouts found in prior work is not a result of
repatriation, a picture may help. We re-estimated the DID model in column III by including three sets
of time dummies. In addition to the standard time dummies which are already included, we added a set
of time dummies multiplied by the probability of repatriation and a set of time dummies multiplied by
whether the firm repatriated income under the AJCA. These variables replace the probability of
repatriation and the residual in column III, and let us see the time pattern of equity payouts for the three
sets of firms (effectively Group 1, 2, and 3 from Table I). The results are graphed in Figure 3. The
graph shows an increase in equity payouts among firms with a high probability of repatriation
following 2004 that did not repatriate (Group 2) and for firms that did repatriate (Group 3). There is
no significant difference in the payout policy arising from repatriation. Among the firms with a high
probability of repatriation (Groups 2 and 3), repatriators do not increase their equity payouts more than35
non-repatriators as we found in Table VIII, column III. Figure 3 also makes it clear why the other
methods would incorrectly attribute the increase in equity payouts to repatriation and why the DFF
(comparing Groups 2&3 to Group 1) method will lead to a greater overestimate than the BK method
(comparing Group 3 to Groups 1&2 – see Section III-B, equations 4 and 5).
When we examine capital constrained and unconstrained firms separately, we find that
unconstrained firms increase their equity payouts but this results is small and not always statistically
significant (see Table VIII, columns IV-VI). Constrained firms increase their payouts by less or in
several specifications decrease their equity payouts, but again the magnitudes are small and not
statistically different from zero. When we examine only repurchases (Table VIII, column VI), the
increase in payouts for unconstrained firms is statistically significant (p-value=0.041), but the
coefficient of 0.43 percent of the equity value is small relative to the size of the repatriation (mean of
8.5 percent of the equity value, median of 3.8 percent). Aggregating over the post-repatriation years,
the increase in equity payout is equivalent to 25.3 percent of the repatriated capital.  However, once
we restrict the sample to only firms with a probability of repatriation above the median or with positive
reported foreign earnings (as we did with investment in Table VI), there is no statistically significant
change in equity payouts whether the firm is constrained or not (see Table IX, columns II, III, and V).
When we estimate the BK model (AJCA dummy and AJCA dummy interacted with our measure of
capital constraints) on the restricted samples, we find no significant change in equity payouts due to
repatriation (see Table IX, columns VI and VII). While our results regarding changes in payout policy
are qualitatively consistent with BK and DFF, the estimated magnitudes of the change in payout policy
arising from repatriation are at most 25.3 percent of the repatriated funds (and in some specifications
much less) rather than the 50 to 90 percent those papers documented.
VII)  Conclusion and Implications
In response to the tax incentives introduced by the American Jobs Creation Act, US
corporations moved over $300B from their foreign subsidiaries to the US. For the average firm we find
little increase in investment as a response. For the subset of firms, however, which are capital36
constrained, we do find a significant increase in investment. These firms are responsible for only a
quarter of the total repatriation and according to our estimates spend a majority of their repatriated
funds on increasing domestic investment. These findings are the results we should expect in the
presence of financial frictions, and thus demonstrate the empirical importance of capital constraints.
In addition, the significant difference between our findings and other examinations of the American
Jobs Creation Act point to the importance of appropriately specifying the difference-in-difference
(DID) regression.
A large academic literature already exists examining the effect of external capital constraints
when firms are short of internal funds. We are one of the first to examine changes in the costs of funds
which are already internal to the firm. The American Jobs Creation Act temporarily lowered the cost
of accessing a portion of the firm’s internal capital for domestic investment, the portion stockpiled in
low tax foreign jurisdictions. When the cost of internal capital is not identical for all internal capital,
it is important to understand the frictions that prevent a firm from allocating its internal capital in the
most efficient way. Our results point to a previously unappreciated source of capital constraints: the
US tax code. The relatively high marginal tax rate on corporate profits relative to the rate in foreign
countries has not only incentivized firms to generate cash stock piles in their foreign subsidiaries (Foley
et al, 2007), but it appears to have also led some firms to forgo domestic investment opportunities that
they otherwise would have taken.
Our paper also points out the importance of financial theory in the design of tax incentives.
Changes in tax rates and rules, can change the relative cost of funding sources. Depending upon what
one assumes about the frictions which cause the perfect market assumption to fail, these changes can
affect the investment decisions of the firm or only change the source of capital used to fund those
investments. This is the case with the American Jobs Creation Act. While we found an increase in
investment among the capital constrained firms, most firms that have foreign operations with
significant unrepatriated foreign income are not capital constrained. This is why we find that most firms
which repatriated under the act did not subsequently increase investment. Since finance theory37
demonstrates that only capital constrained firms will forgo positive investment opportunities,
government policy that attempts to increase investment must target incentives towards capital
constrained firms.38
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Table I: Hypothetical Data Structure
 Group Before After Change
1 No Tax Adv Foreign Earnings
(do not repatriate under the AJCA)
Y1 Y1 0%
2 Positive Tax Adv Foreign Earnings
(do not repatriate under the AJCA)
Y2 Y2+2% 2%
3 Positive Tax Adv Foreign Earnings
(repatriate under the AJCA)
Y3 Y3+2% 2%
Notes:
The table describes a hypothetical data structure to which we could apply a difference-in-
difference regression. For illustrative purposes, we have assumed that firms which do not have tax
advantaged foreign earnings (Group 1) do not increase the response variable Y (e.g. investment or
equity payouts) in the second half of the sample (post 2003) versus the first half of the sample (pre-
2004). We have assumed that firms with tax advantaged foreign earnings increase the response
variable in the second half of the sample by 2% whether they repatriate (Group 3) or not (Group 2).
Thus for this illustration, we have assumed that repatriation has no effect on the response variable.
There are three ways in which to collapse the data into a treated and untreated group when
applying the DID regression. The first method used by Blouin and Krull (2009) uses a dummy
variable which is equal to one for firms that repatriate in the year they repatriated and subsequent
years, and zero otherwise. Thus the coefficient estimate measures the change in the response
variable for Group 3 relative to Group 1 and 2. In our illustration, even through repatriation has no
effect (by assumption), the coefficient will be positive (see Section III-B and equation 4 for details).
The second method is used by Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes (2011) effectively replaces
the dummy variable used in BK with the predicted probability of repatriation from a prior
regression. Thus the coefficient estimate measures the change in the response variable for Group 2
and 3 relative to Group 1. In our illustration, even through repatriation has no effect (by
assumption), the coefficient will be positive and larger than estimated using the BK method (see
Section III-B and equation 5 for details). 
The third approach, used in this paper, includes both the predicted probability of repatriation
(as in DFF) and the residual which is the dummy variable used in BK minus the predicted
probability of repatriation. The coefficient on the predicted probability of repatriation measures the
change in the response variable for Group 2 and 3 relative to Group 1 and would be 2% in this
example. The coefficient on the residual measures the change in the response variable for Group 3
relative to Group 2 and would be zero in this example since repatriation has no effect in our
illustration.41


































Remaining Industries 216,872 288 219,809
Note:
The table lists the top ten industries (3 digit SIC) in terms of total amounts repatriated under
the AJCA. The second and third columns are the total amount of foreign earnings repatriated under
the AJCA by firms in the industry (in $M) and the number of firms that repatriated income in that
industry, respectively. The fourth column is the total amount of permanently reinvested earnings
(PRE) that were disclosed by firms in the industry as of 2003, i.e. the year prior to passage of the
American Jobs Creation Act (in $M).42
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The table contains summary statistics (means and medians) for our sample of firms. The
firms have been divided into those that repatriated foreign earnings under the AJCA and those that
did not. The sample runs from 2000 to 2007, except for the data on permanently reinvested earnings,
which runs only through 2005. The superscripts in the first column denote whether the mean
(median) in column one is statistically different from the mean (median) in column two at the 1, 5,
or 10% level.44
Table IV: Estimated Probability of Repatriation
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Pseudo-R2 0.2106 0.4472 0.7520 0.3719
Number of Observations 5272 4950 4933 495045
Notes:
The table contains cross-sectional logits, where the dependent variable is whether the firm
repatriated foreign income under the American Jobs Creation Act in 2004 or later (columns I and
II). The independent variables are based on values for the firm in 2003 and in some cases prior
years. A tobit model is estimated in column III and the dependent variable is the amount of the
repatriation standardized by the market value of assets or zero. Column IV contains an ordered logit
estimation where the dependent variable is 2 if the firm repatriated foreign income under the AJCA,
1 if it discussed repatriation of foreign income under the AJCA in their 10-K but did not repatriate
(e.g. considered), and 0 otherwise. White standard errors are reported in parenthesis.46
Table V: Investment Incentives of the AJCA
I II III IV V
Firm Repatriated under AJCA
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R2 0.7205 0.7206 0.7206 0.7210 0.7343
Number of Observations 37294 37294 37294 37294 34209
Notes:
The table contains panel regressions of approved domestic investment to book value of assets
on firm characteristics and controls for whether the firm was likely to repatriate as well as whether
it did. Column I contains a dummy variable equal to one in the year the firm repatriated and
following years, and zero other wise (BK method). In column II, the dummy variable is replaced by
the probability that the firm repatriates under the AJCA in years 2004 and beyond, and zero
otherwise (DFF method). The probability of repatriation is based on the coefficient estimates from
Table IV, column II. In column III, both the probability of repatriation and the residual (the dummy
variable from column I minus the probability of repatriation) are included. In columns IV and V, the
residual is interacted with a measure of capital constraints. In column IV, capital constrained is
measured as the percentage of the fiscal years during 2000 to 2003 in which the firm’s investment
expenditures exceeded its internal cash flow. In column V, capital constrained is measured the same
way if the firm does not have an S&P long-term debt or commercial paper rating, and zero
otherwise. Each regression contains a dummy variable for each firm and each year. Standard errors
clustered by firm are reported in parenthesis. The sample runs from 2000 to 2007.47
Table VI: Investment Incentives of the AJCA 
High Probability of Repatriation Sub-sample










































Firm Repatriated under AJCA
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R2 0.7210 0.6546 0.6099 0.7343 0.6667 0.6546 0.6100
Number of Observations 37294 20264 12616 34209 18373 20264 12616
Capital Constrained CF CF CF CF&NR CF&NR CF CF
Sample Full High Pr For Earn Full High Pr High Pr For Earn48
Notes:
The table contains panel regressions of approved domestic investment to book value of assets on firm characteristics, the probability
of repatriation, the residual, and the residual interacted with a measure of capital constraints (as in Table V).  Columns I and IV are
estimated for the full sample and are the same as reported in Table V, columns IV and V. Columns II, V, and VI are estimated using only
the sub-sample of firms whose estimated probability of repatriating (based on the estimates from Table IV) are above the median. Columns
III and VII are estimated using only the sub-sample of firms that have a positive amount of unrepatriated foreign income by either of the
measures used in Table IV. In columns I, II, III, VI, and VII capital constrained is measured as the percentage of the fiscal years during
2000 to 2003 in which the firm’s investment expenditures exceeded its internal cash flow (CF). In columns IV and V, capital constrained
is measured the same way if the firm does not have an S&P long-term debt or commercial paper rating, and zero otherwise (CF&NR).
Each regression contains a dummy variable for each firm and each year. Standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parenthesis. The
sample runs from 2000 to 2007.49
Table VII: Leverage Effects of the AJCA
I II III IV V VI
Dependent Variable D/MVA D/MVA D/MVA D/MVA D/MVA ND/MVA
Firm Repatriated under AJCA  
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R2 0.8462 0.8463 0.8463 0.8463 0.8588 0.8360
Number of Observations 37157 37157 37157 37157 34086 3715550
Notes:
The table contains panel regressions of the debt to market value of asset ratio (columns I-V) or the net debt (debt minus cash) to
market value of assets (column VI) on firm characteristics, the probability of repatriation, the residual, and the residual interacted with
a measure of capital constraints. Column I contains a dummy variable equal to one in the year the firm repatriated and following years,
and zero other wise (BK method). In column II, the dummy variable is replaced by the probability that the firm repatriates under the AJCA
in years 2004 and beyond, and zero otherwise (DFF method). The probability of repatriation is based on the coefficient estimates from
Table IV, column II. In column III, both the probability of repatriation and the residual (the dummy variable from column I minus the
probability of repatriation) are included. In columns IV-VI, the residual is interacted with a measure of capital constraints. In column IV
and VI, capital constrained is measured as the percentage of the fiscal years during 2000 to 2003 in which the firm’s investment
expenditures exceeded its internal cash flow. In column V, capital constrained is measured the same way if the firm does not have an S&P
long-term debt or commercial paper rating, and zero otherwise. Each regression contains a dummy variable for each firm and each year.
Standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parenthesis. The sample runs from 2000 to 2007.51
Table VIII: Equity Payout Effects of the AJCA 
I II III IV V VI
Dependent Variable D+R/MVE D+R/MVE D+R/MVE D+R/MVE D+R/MVE R/MVE
Firm Repatriated under AJCA  






















































Market Value of Assets/





































Capital Constrained if  










R2 0.4769 0.4777 0.4777 0.4788 0.4918 0.3671
Number of Observations 31098 31098 31098 31098 28429 3160652
Notes:
The table contains panel regressions of the dividend and repurchases to market value of equity ratio (columns I-V) or repurchase
to the market value of equity (column VI) on firm characteristics, the probability of repatriation, the residual, and the residual interacted
with a measure of capital constraints. Column I contains a dummy variable equal to one in the year the firm repatriated and following
years, and zero otherwise (BK method). In column II, the dummy variable is replaced by the probability that the firm repatriates under
the AJCA in years 2004 and beyond, and zero otherwise (DFF method). The probability of repatriation is based on the coefficient estimates
from Table IV, column II. In column III, both the probability of repatriation and the residual (the dummy variable from column I minus
the probability of repatriation) are included. In columns IV-VI, the residual is interacted with a measure of capital constraints. In column
IV and VI, capital constrained is measured as the percentage of the fiscal years during 2000 to 2003 in which the firm’s investment
expenditures exceeded its internal cash flow. In column V, capital constrained is measured the same way if the firm does not have an S&P
long-term debt or commercial paper rating, and zero otherwise. Each regression contains a dummy variable for each firm and each year.
Standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parenthesis. The sample runs from 2000 to 2007.53
Table IX: Equity Payout Effects of the AJCA
High Probability of Repatriation Sub-sample









































Firm Repatriated under AJCA
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R2 0.4778 0.4298 0.3856 0.4918 0.4410 0.4293 0.3839
Number of Observations 31098 17500 11331 28429 15778 17500 11331
Capital Constrained CF CF CF CF&NR CF&NR CF CF
Sample Full High Pr For Earn Full High Pr High Pr For Earn54
Notes:
The table contains panel regressions of the dividend and repurchases to market value of equity ratio on firm characteristics, the
probability of repatriation, the residual, and the residual interacted with a measure of capital constraints. Columns I and IV are estimated
for the full sample and are the same as reported in Table VIII, columns IV and V. Columns II, V, and VI are estimated using only the sub-
sample of firms whose estimated probability of repatriating (based on the estimates from Table IV) are above the median. Columns III
and VII are estimated using only the sub-sample of firms that have a positive amount of unrepatriated foreign income by either of the
measures used in Table IV. In columns I, II, III, VI, and VII capital constrained is measured as the percentage of the fiscal years during
2000 to 2003 in which the firm’s investment expenditures exceeded its internal cash flow. In columns IV and V, capital constrained is
measured the same way if the firm does not have an S&P long-term debt or commercial paper rating, and zero otherwise. Each regression
contains a dummy variable for each firm and each year. Standard errors clustered by firm are reported in parenthesis. The sample runs
from 2000 to 2007.55
Figure 1: Permanently Reinvested Earnings
Notes:
Firms with foreign income must report the incremental tax that is due upon repatriation as
a deferred tax liability if they do not repatriate the income. An exception arises if the firm deems the
foreign income to be permanently or indefinitely invested abroad. In this case, the firm is not
required to recognize the future tax liability on their balance sheet but is required to disclose the
amount of permanently reinvested earnings or the tax which would be due upon repatriation (see
Section II-B). The figure reports the unconditional probability that a firm in our sample reports
having permanently reinvested earnings (diamonds) as well as this probability conditional on the
firm reporting positive foreign income or foreign taxes in the same year (squares). Along the right
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Pr[Perm Reinv] Pr[ Perm Reinv | For Inc/Tax>0 ] Perm Reinvested ($B)56
Figure 2: Leverage of Treatment Firms versus Non-Treatment Firms
Notes:
The figure is based on the data from Table VII. We started with the regression in column II
which includes year dummies (λt), and then replace the probability of repatriation with a set of year
dummies times the probability of repatriation (see equation 10). The coefficients on these interaction
variables (γ) measure the difference in leverage between the high probability of repatriation (Group
2 & 3) and low probability of repatriation (Group 1) firms after controlling for the independent
variables (X) and firm dummies (μ). These coefficients (γ) are graphed here. They show that the
leverage of the high Pr[Repat] firms relative to the low Pr[Repat] firms is declining over the sample
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  it it it Leverage βXP r R e p a t itt i t       (10)57
Figure 3: Annual Equity Payout Across the Three Groups
Notes:
The figure is based on the data from Table VIII. We started with the regression in column
III, which includes year dummies (λt), and then replace the probability of repatriation and the
residual with a set of year dummies times the probability of repatriation and another set of year
dummies times a dummy variable for whether the firm repatriated income under the AJCA (see
equation 11). Estimated payout ratios based on these coefficient estimates are graphed in the above
figure where each of the three groups is assumed to have the same payout ratio (the sample mean)
in 2000. Group 1 (low probability of repatriation) is graphed as diamonds, Group 2 (high probability
of repatriation, but did not repatriate) is graphed as squares connected by a line, and Group 3
(repatriating firms) is graphed as a line. The picture shows an increase in payouts for Group 2 and
3 following 2004, but no difference between the firms that repatriate (Group 3) and those with a high
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